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ABSTRACT	  
In recent years, the scope and number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and other charity foundations have been bourgeoning in China. While each of these 
organizations has its own unique agendas and target recipients, they are bounded by 
the common goal to improve certain human conditions for disadvantaged individuals 
or population groups. By using a case study methodology, and analyzing first-hand 
data from in-depth interviews conducted with various stakeholders, this article sheds 
light on some of the current barriers in implementing effective orphan care policies in 
rural China, and illustrate how NGOs can complement government efforts in 
providing adequate care for orphans. Organizational theory is used as a paradigm 
through which the relationship between the State and NGOs is analyzed. Implications 
for future child welfare development in China are discussed.  	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INTRODUCTION  
 
In recent years, civil society organizations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
have been actively promoting social development imperatives such as improving 
environmental standards, promoting human rights and advocating for disadvantaged 
population groups such as rural migrants and orphans afflicted with HIV/AIDS. These 
organizations, both local and international ones, have intensified their level of 
involvement at a time where the PRC continues to wrestle with long-standing and 
emerging social and environmental problems, some of which are negative 
externalities resulting from the combination of rapid economic growth and the 
retrenchment of welfare provision for the general public.  
 
Among the many social development challenges that confront China today, this 
article focuses on child welfare development in rural China, with particular emphasis 
on welfare provision for orphans. Findings are presented from a qualitative field study 
conducted in a local community of Butuo County, in Liangshan prefecture, Sichuan 
province.  
 
Previous studies on international non-governmental organization (INGO)-State 
collaboration in the PRC are mainly in the domains of environmental protection, 
human rights, and poverty alleviation (Ron, Ramos, & Rodgers, 2005; Yang, 2005; 
Yu, 2006). There is a dearth of research concerning the impact of INGOs on the 
development of child welfare practices in China, and even fewer studies have looked 
at the dynamics between INGO and the State at the local, and community levels.  
 
There are, however, several exceptional and prominent international agencies such as 
Half the Sky Foundation, UNICEF and SOS Villages that are pushing forward the 
child welfare agenda. For example, Half the Sky Foundation has introduced the 
Reggio Emilia approach towards orphan care to 31 cities across China, and has 
provided training programs for child welfare workers (see www.halfthesky.org). 
Similarly, the SOS Children’s Villages, which began its work in China in mid-1980s, 
have established a series of “children villages” in ten locations across China, with 
each of these villages organized in a “home-like” environment and providing 
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developmental needs for orphaned children (for details, see www.sos-
childrensvillages.org).  
 
It must be duly acknowledged that local Chinese NGOs are also contributing to the 
country’s child welfare development, yet as globalization continues to intensify our 
interdependence and connections, the “global forces” seemed to have made 
considerable impact in the field. The collaboration process between these agencies 
and the State, however, is less explored. At present, while there are several prominent 
models of orphan care in China, it is rather less known as to how these international 
organizations have brought about these changes.   
 
In retrospect, INGOs were once regarded with high skepticism, mistrust, and 
suspicion. They were seen as instruments, disguised under the façades of “charity”, 
“international aid”, and “social development”, and designed by the West to undermine 
China’s political regime (Gu, Humphrey, & Messner, 2008). Not until the 1990s did 
China allow itself to integrate and engage with the world. Today, China has signed on 
as many as 266 international treaties and is home to more than 130 intergovernmental 
and international organizations (G. Chan, 2006, p. 70). According to a Xinhua news 
report (2012-03-20), the number of legally registered local and international NGOs 
totaled at around 460,000 in 2012. Indeed, since the early 1980s, China has continued 
its engagement with the world, and has achieved significant improvement for the 
wellbeing of its people, although development has been uneven.  
 
Although this may seem encouraging, these organizations operate under heavy State 
supervision, sometimes at the costs of its own autonomy and decision-making powers. 
Three types of NGOs are legally “allowed” to operate in China: social organizations 
(社會團體或社團), private non-enterprise units and foundations (民辦非企業單位或
基金會), or external branches of international NGOs (國際 NGO 的分支機構). 
Under China’s current laws and regulations on NGOs, these organizations are 
required to register under a related governmental department (usually a department 
under the Ministry of Civil Affairs).  
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Since all NGOs must technically operate under the supervision of the Chinese State, 
several assumptions are made in this paper. Firstly, NGOs and state departments can 
be perceived as organizations themselves, each having their own agendas to pursuit. 
Secondly, due to China’s regulation on NGOs, these organizations all share a 
relationship with the State. Thirdly, the nature of these relationships may differ from 
one organization to the next—these can range from mutual existence, to coordination, 
to collaboration, to partnership. Together, these various relationships have produced 
different results in the child welfare sector. As such, the objectives of this paper are 
to: 
1) Identify the type of relationship that Fu Hui share with the local government 
of Butuo;  
2) To examine how collaboration is carried out in the context of welfare 
provision for orphans;  
3) Examine the advantages and costs of collaboration between the State and 
INGOs using an organizational perspective;  
4) Identify an unique care model for orphans in rural Butuo area 
 
Using an organizational perspective and integrating concepts derived from 
collaboration theories, the purpose of this paper is to highlight some major findings 
from the case study of Liangshan and to discuss their implications for INGO-State 
collaboration in the child welfare sector, and to a greater extent, China’s future social 
development agenda.  
 
 
Theories on Collaboration  
 
Social scientists have long been contending the theories and models pertaining to 
collaboration. Different theoretical perspectives have been employed in 
conceptualizing “collaboration”. Among many others, these include theory of 
transaction cost economies, exchange theory, organizational learning, public 
administration, and institutional theories (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Osborne & 
Hagedoorn, 1997; Thomson & Perry, 2006).  
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In public administration literature, there are two main competing theories in 
understanding collaboration. Although much of the literature in this domain is 
generated from the US, they are useful in conceptualizing the collaboration process in 
the context of INGO-State relation in China as well. These competing ideologies 
consist of the classic liberalism perspective and the civic republicanism perspective 
(Perry & Thomson, 2004).  
 
Advocates of the classic liberalism perspective argue that organizations or actors enter 
collaboration based on self-interest, the ultimate objectives of which are to achieve 
their own personal agendas and goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006). In this school of 
thought, actors are expected to negotiate and bargain among different potential 
collaborators, and arrive at a collaborative relationship that best serve their own 
personal interest. Collaboration, argued by Bardach (1998), is only effective when 
parties are self-motivated, and when collaboration is expected to yield better 
organizational performance. This is not unlike transaction cost economies 
(Williamson, 1979),  which assumes that actors make rational decisions based on 
maximizing efficiency and minimizing costs.  
 
Contrastingly, proponents of the civic republicanism perspective claim that actors in 
collaborative relationship may well be acting on something more other than simply 
individual needs and desires. Civic republicanism emphasizes participation, 
community-sharing, and collective identities. As such, collaboration is seen as an 
integrative process that acknowledges and treats differences as the basis for 
deliberation (Thomson & Perry, 2006), in order to arrive at “mutual understanding, a 
collective will, trust and sympathy” (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 126), and ultimately to 
enact and implement those shared preferences and goals.  
 
In the context of rural China, providing adequate child welfare services are 
problematic due to institutional deficiencies and poor infrastructure. Both civic 
republicanism and classic liberalism, while useful in its depiction of certain 
collaborative relationship in public administration, do not satisfactorily offer a 
theoretical foundation through which collaborative relationships between the State 
and international charity organizations can be analyzed.  
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Characteristics of Different Forms of Collaboration  
 
The term “collaboration” has been interpreted in various ways, the most succinct of 
which is perhaps the one provided by Chrislip and Larson (1994, p. 5), which defined 
collaboration as: 
 
“…A mutually beneficial relationship between two or more parties to achieve 
common goals by sharing responsibility, authority and accountability for 
achieving results. It is more than simply sharing knowledge and information 
(communication) and more than a relationship that helps each party achieve its 
own goals (cooperation and coordination). The purpose of collaboration is to 
create a shared vision and joint strategies to address concerns that go beyond 
the purview of any particularly party” 
 
Chrislip and Larson (1994) allude to the fact that there are different degrees of 
collaboration. Indeed, there are different characteristics associated with various forms 
of inter-agency or inter-organizational interactions. For example, Bowen (2005) 
claims that collaboration is the midpoint of a continuum. At one end of the continuum 
is cooperation, which suggests that stakeholders coexist, with some sharing of ideas 
and information. At the other end of the spectrum is partnership, where parties 
become interdependent, exhibiting high levels of trust (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), 
communication (Mohr & Nevin, 1990), and effective conflict resolution techniques 
(Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 1998). Collaboration naturally sits between 
the two, where there is good communication but not total interdependence.  
 
In the field of social development, collaboration may be considered as a strategic 
alliance struck between parties in attempt to promote positive social change. Different 
parties may play different roles in collaborative relationships, including that of the 
funder, assembler and partners (Himmelman, 1994). Having synthesized what some 
of these scholars have presented as effective models of collaboration, Table 1 shows 
the incremental levels of interactions between actors and stakeholders, and the 
respective characteristics at each stage. This table also serves as an inquiry framework 
to which questions during the author’s fieldwork were posed to relevant individuals 
according to these categories.  
 
Table 1. Different forms of working relationships and their characteristics  
 Cooperation Collaboration Partnership 
Communication  Minimal  Good  Very good  
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Trust Low  Middle  High  
Commitment  Independent  Middle  High  
Shared vision Minimal  Yes – agreed upon  Yes – clearly 
defined 
Sustainability  Minimal  Stable but 
conditioned by 
both internal and 
external factors 
Long-term 
sustainability  
Intensity of 
Engagement  
Low ------------------------Middle------------------High  
 
 
The Organizational Perspective  
 
Together with the concepts drawn from collaboration theories, an organizational 
perspective is used as a paradigm through which relationship between the Chinese 
State and the Charity Foundation, Fu Hui, is analyzed. As such, both the State and Fu 
Hui will be perceived as organizations operating in the context of child welfare 
provision. This paper argues that from an organizational perspective, both INGOs and 
the State can benefit from one another by entering into a collaborative relationship. 
While such a conclusion may not be generalizable to depict the dynamics between all 
other INGOs and the State, it nevertheless illustrates a potential way in which the 
State can engage with an INGO in order to produce positive developmental results.  
 
There are two main competing perspectives within organizational literature that 
warrants some analyzes.  
 
Instrumental Perspective 
Proponents of the instrumental perspective argue that public organizations (i.e. State 
agencies) are tools and instruments for realizing particular goals that are important to 
society (Christensen, Laegreid, Roness, & Rovik, 2007), such as improving the 
standards of child welfare. In other others, organizations are a means to an end. 
Members of public organizations are assumed to be making decisions and carrying 
out tasks based on instrumental rationality—the idea that leaders choose a certain 
course of action after considering all alternatives, and choosing the most efficient way 
to arrive at the organization’s goals based on rational calculation.  
 
Cultural Perspective  
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While the instrumental perspective is based on the idea of logic and consequence, and 
of rationality, proponents of the cultural perspective argue that organizational 
culture—including informal norms, attitudes, beliefs and values—are important 
elements that affect organizational behavior (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003; 
Schein, 1996). Analysts from a cultural perspective would seek to understand how 
organizational participants experience and make sense of organizations (Schneider, 
1987), and argue that organizational culture plays an important role in shaping 
individual and group behaviors. Schein (1992, p. 12) suggest that organizational 
culture can be perceived as: 
“a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it evolved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered value, and therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.” 
 
Through the process of socialization, the accumulation of these informal culture, 
values, and attitudes will eventually lead these organizations to exhibit institutional 
features; organizations are subsequently described as institutionalized organizations 
(Christensen et al., 2007). The presumption is that individuals will act, not out of 
rational deliberation or assessment, but instead will make decisions based on 
matching—whether a particular decision “fits” the organizational culture (Ibid.). A 
question that one might ask based on the concept of matching is: “what am I expected 
to do in a situation like this?” This significantly differs from instrumental rationality.  
 
 
Engagement of INGOs as Failure of the State? Negotiating an INGO-State 
Relation  
Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has been increasingly outsourcing public 
services to private agencies or other Chinese NGOs (Han, 2011). Wood (1996) argues 
that while outsourcing public welfare services to the private market or agencies 
allows the government to downsize its responsibility, citizens lose their ability to hold 
the government accountable for services. However, as mentioned earlier, Chinese 
NGOs and private agencies are still heavily monitored by the State. In fact, what is 
significantly distinctive among Chinese NGOs from Western ones is that Chinese 
NGOs are required to operate under the supervision of either a government institution 
or a government-organizations NGO (GONGO) active in the same field as the NGO 
(Ma, 2006).  
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Unlike the United States, where collaboration is deeply rooted in the public 
administration system (Thomson & Perry, 2006), collaboration between the State and 
civil society, especially that of INGOs is relatively new in the PRC. Not until the 
1990s did international organizations truly mushroomed in China. Some of the more 
prominent INGOs that have been active in the domain of child welfare include Save 
The Children, UNICEF, SOS Villages, and World Vision. Their increased presence in 
the PRC may signal the government’s growing willingness, or perhaps more 
accurately, concession, to allow growing numbers of international organizations and 
charity foundations to intervene in domestic welfare affairs. From the INGOs’ 
standpoint, it can also be argued that they too, are compromising a part of their 
autonomy in exchange for the ability to access, and to operate, in a nondemocratic 
environment.  
 
However, rather than romanticizing the relationship between the State and INGO, or 
the impact of INGO on social development in the PRC, Tsai (2011) cautions us not to 
take the growing number of non-state actors as an accurate reflection of the 
legitimacy of, or the independence of civil society. While ordinary citizens may 
welcome the expansion of non-state sector, the Chinese government remains 
somewhat reserved towards this phenomenon. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
being a one-party regime, may see these non-state actors as political competitors, and 
therefore fear the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. After all, the State is 
supposed to play a leading role in providing welfare for its people, and not “outsiders” 
(Cook, 1993). Salamon (1987) even suggests that non-state provision reflects 
government ‘failure’.  
 
Salamon’s (1987) suggestions may be discouraging and would most definitely be 
rejected by Chinese authority, but it offers insights as to why INGOs have their 
specific roles and functions (i.e. as a funder, watchdog, convener, etc.) in 
contemporary China. It is self-evident that both NGOs and INGOs are present, either 
to provide services or perform functions that are not yet in place, or to supplement 
government services that these agencies perceive as inadequate. Today, scholars 
examining the Chinese government’s attitude towards foreign NGOs have arrived at 
different conclusions. For instance, Yin (2009) contends that collaborating with 
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INGOs will allow the Chinese government to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community, and hence should be encouraged. Contrastingly, Zhao (2006, 
p. 8) argues that while INGOs may have bring positive impact on China’s social 
development, the Chinese government is also wary that foreign NGOs would 
“undermine national security and political stability” (by spying and gathering 
intelligence on military, political and economic conditions) and promote foreign 
practices that are incompatible with China’s cultural and environmental conditions.  
 
Nevertheless, rather than attributing the presence of INGO as a “substitution” for the 
State or a reflection of the State’s “failure” in providing adequate care, this paper 
posits that INGOs can work complementarily to the State, and become agents of 
social change.   
 
Child Welfare Development in the PRC  
 
Although China has experienced unprecedented economic growth over the past few 
decades, and has subsequently lifted millions out of poverty, wealth did not spread 
evenly across different regions and population groups. On the one hand, market 
reforms have drawn in more resources that were previously unavailable in the 
centralized planned economy. These include increased financial resources, and 
extended latitude for international organizations and civil society to thrive.  On the 
other hand, due to deregulation and privatization that underlie economic reforms, the 
central government’s ability to implement and enforce effective and adequate care for 
disadvantaged children has been weakened (Shang, 2002). Indeed, due to 
decentralization, local governments have now assumed a more pivotal role in welfare 
provision for its local residents (Adams & Hannum, 2005). This is problematic, not 
least because resources are starkly uneven across localities. 
 
Accurate statistics regarding the number of Chinese orphans are extremely hard to 
procure. A government official allegedly stated that the number of orphans was 
around 140,000 in 1990 (WuDunn, 1991, p. 1). More recently, according to the 
Stocking Report (2011, p. 13) that was conducted by the Beijing Normal University, 
and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) in partnership with the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the One Foundation, the number of orphans and 
abandoned children in China increased from around 574,000 in 2005 to around 
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712,000 in 2010. Despite continual growth in the country’s GDP, the number of 
abandoned children is increasing, a trend that perhaps reflect the inadequacy of social 
welfare policies and child welfare programs in contemporary China.  
 
The surprisingly low number of orphans is often criticized as inaccurate and 
unreliable. A registered non-governmental organization (NGO), All Girls Allowed 
(2012), asserts that there were at least 17 million orphans in 2007 alone while a report 
made by UNICEF (2008) states that there are over 21 million orphans in China. There 
are several possible explanations for the huge discrepancies in numbers.   
Different definitions of Orphans  
In China, the definition of “orphans” has changed over the past few decades. For 
example, the MCA referred orphans as children who are under the age of 14, and 
whose both parents are deceased in 1992. However, the definition of orphan was 
revised to refer children under the age of 18, who had lost their parents through death 
or abandonment and/or are unsupported by others in 2006 (Liu & Zhu, 2009). The 
latter definition is considerably broader and may provide some explanation regarding 
the discrepancy in orphans-related statistics. At present, there are generally two 
classifications of orphans: “actual orphans” (shuanggu) refers to children under 18 
who have lost both parents to death while the “form orphans” (dangu) include 
children who receive no parental care due to abandonment, children whose parents are 
missing for more than 4 years, and children who receive no family care (Liu & Zhu, 
2009) 
International agencies such as UNICEF (2012) defines orphans as “a child who has 
lost one or both parents”. Thus, statistics may vary depending on the terminology 
applied. This broader definition of orphans may explain why the number of orphans 
put forth by UNICEF is much larger than that of the Chinese government.  
While child abandonment continues to be a social problem that confronts the country, 
it must be acknowledged that the government had repeatedly affirmed its commitment 
towards improving child welfare by ratifying and enacting a series of international 
protocols, national policies, and legislations. Among them are the United Nations 
Conventions of the Rights of Child (ratified in 1991), the PRC Law of Adoption 
(1991), the PRC Law on the Protection of Minors (1991), the PRC Law on Maternal 
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and Infant Health (1994), Provisions of the Prohibition of Using Child Labor (2002), 
the National Program of Action for Child Development in China (2001-2010; 2011-
2020), and the Strengthening the Protection of Orphans (2010) issued by the State 
Council, which details the rights of orphans in the areas of care arrangement, basic 
livelihood (public financial support), medical rehabilitation and education. 
Despite these efforts, there appears to be a stark contrast between rhetoric and reality.  
Public Provision for Orphans: Differences between Rural and Urban Areas  
 
Welfare for orphans and abandoned children has gained considerable attention in the 
public policy arena in recent years. While many urban areas such as Guangzhou, 
Shanghai and Beijing have already began experimenting with different forms of 
orphan care found to be more beneficial to child outcomes—such as establishing 
small group homes and promoting foster care—orphans in rural areas have been 
neglected rather significantly, not least because rural areas have considerably less 
resources compared to their urban counterparts.  
 
In retrospect, there is a considerable body of literature dedicated towards analyzing 
the urban-rural dichotomy in terms of welfare distribution (see Park (2008); Sicular, 
Yue, Bjorn, and Li (2007); Kanbur and Zhang (2005); Lu (2002)). Most of these 
studies reaffirm the notion that urban and rural inequality is widening in terms of both 
welfare distribution and economic progress.  
However, fewer studies have analyzed the discourse on welfare distribution in terms 
of public provision for childcare, especially orphan care, though several studies have 
provided valuable insights into the way in which orphan care and child welfare are 
operationalized in China’s rural areas. For instance, Shang (2008) explored the role of 
extended families in procuring welfare for orphaned children in rural areas in 
Southern China, and argued that the State is urgently needed to improve the quality of 
care for these children despite support from relatives.  
As a result of income inequality between rural and urban areas, and between coastal 
and inland regions, the availability of, and the access to resources are stratified across 
rural and urban population groups. To illustrate one possible implication of income 
inequality on children’s wellbeing, Yi and associates (2011) examined the infant 
	   12	  
mortality rate between rural and urban areas in Gansu province. Unsurprisingly, it 
was found that rural areas had an infant mortality rate 2.5 and 2.8 times higher than 
urban infant mortality rate (Yi et al., 2011, p. 477).  
Without any major allocation or redistribution mechanism in place, children in urban 
areas will disproportionately enjoy higher quality of care and resources. Indeed, 
studies such as the one conducted by Adams and Hannum (2005) found that the 
provision and availability of welfare services very much depend on local communities, 
especially local community financing. The authors also found that children who lived 
in wealthier communities are more likely to have health insurance and better access to 
education. By the same token, although there is still much room for improvement in 
child welfare in both urban and rural areas, wealthier cities have at least more 
capacity to push forward new initiatives and programs designed to improve the 
wellbeing of disadvantaged children whereas rural areas have much poorer abilities. 
My research has led me to observe that Street Offices with better economic income 
can afford to provide more welfare services in the urban city of Guangzhou as well. 
this was consistent with Chan’s (1993) study in the late 1980s in Guangzhou.  
However, it must also be cautioned that urban areas are faced with complex problems 
of their own. The plethora of disadvantaged children groups such as street children, 
migrant children, children of domestic abuse point towards the limitations of urban 
welfare provision for children as well.  
Research Approach 
 
This research is part of an ongoing research project that began in late July 2011. A 
qualitative exploratory case study was conducted in Liangshan prefecture in Sichuan 
province. Relevant personnel including government officials who are working closely 
with Fu Hui, as well as administrators and directors of the Fu Hui Education 
foundation were interviewed. While the organizational perspective is used as an 
inquiry framework to analyze the relationship between the government and Fu Hui, 
the author seeks to expand the theory through its application in the unique area of 
Liangshan.  
 
Site Selection: The Case of Liangshan  
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This research began in October, 2012 in Butuo county, a rural area of 1,865 sq km in 
Liangshan prefecture, Sichuan. According to Heifer International, an NGO based in 
Hong Kong, the average annual per capita income in Butuo capita is only RMB 1000 
(Heifer, 2013), which is far below China’s newly revised rural poverty line of RMB 
2,300 per annum. Residents of Butuo mostly rely on subsistence agriculture for 
economic survival. 
Child abandonment is a serious issue in Butuo township, and in the greater Liangshan 
prefecture in general. Liangshan Prefecture has a population of around 4.73 million. 
The area is also heavily affected by HIV/AIDS. According to a Xinhua news report 
(2011), there is approximately 21,565 cases of AIDS in the year 2010. The virus is 
contracted due to a combination of socioeconomic factors such as poverty, problems 
with drug use (needle-sharing) and unprotected sexual contact. The Xinhua news 
report claims that Chen Lunan of the local MCA reported that there are currently 
8,000 orphans in Liangshan, and about 3,000 parents have died of AIDS (Xinhua, 
2011). The children who are subsequently left behind are usually cared for by older 
relatives such as grandparents and extended family members. 
This study began in Butuo county, one of the counties within Liangshan prefecture. It 
has population of approximately 140,000, most of whom are of the Yi minority group.  
Having a dominant minority population has significant implication on the welfare of 
children. To begin with, because members of minority groups do not need to abide by 
the One Child Policy, most Yi families have two or more children. Unfortunately, 
given the high levels of poverty, more children suffer the consequences of resource 
deprivation. Moreover, when a parent, especially the father, leaves or abandons/dies, 
it further exacerbates the problem of poverty for his family, thereby further 
jeopardizing the safety and wellbeing of minors and women.   
Although Liangshan prefecture is an autonomous prefecture under Chinese law, 
national policies pertaining to child welfare are still legally recognized, meaning that 
residents in Butuo county are equally entitled to public provision of orphan care as the 
rest of the country. The differences, if any, between political rhetoric and reality will 
be explored in subsequent sections of this paper.  
History of Fu Hui Education Foundation  
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Fu Hui is an international non-profit charity foundation established in 2004 in Canada 
by a group of Hong Kong migrants to Canada, and has been serving disadvantaged 
children in China since 2005. It is intended to provide better educational opportunities 
for children, mostly in the rural areas of Shaanxi Jiangxi, Sichuan, Liangshan, and 
Guangdong. By way of offering scholarships and sponsorship, the number of children 
who have benefited from Fu Hui had totaled at 3,000 in addition to 1,300 sponsored 
orphans between years 2005 to 2009.  
What is distinct in Fu Hui’s own organizational operation is that it follows a “zero-
administration-cost” policy. That is to say, all workers within Fu Hui are acting 
voluntarily, without pay, and have to pay for all of their personal travel expenses if 
they go on field trips to China. Their headquarters in Hong Kong is bought by a 
special donation and salary of a few full time staff were also donated by their Board 
Members. All donations solicited from the community donors are therefore channeled 
directly towards recipients without administration costs.  
Since 2006, Fu Hui established the Liangshan Orphans Program, which provided food, 
clothing, medical insurance, and hired nannies for orphans aged 7 to 11. This 
signified an expansion in the organization’s agenda, evolving from an educational-
directed purpose to one that is inclusive to a child’s other developmental and survival 
needs.  
Service recipients (orphans) of the Liangshan Orphans Program will generally be sent 
to attend a boarding school, where Fu Hui will be in charge of the daily needs such as 
food, clothing and adequate medical insurance for orphans.  
To date, the author has travelled to Butuo three times as one of Fu Hui’s volunteers, 
each visit comprising 10 to 14 days. The author has conducted home visits in order 
examine the level of deprivation that these children are suffering from. Nine in-depth 
individual interviews have been conducted, each ranging from one to three hours. 
This is part of an ongoing research.  
 
Obstacles to Ensure Welfare Rights for Orphans in Liangshan  
 
Successful policy implementation depends on both external and internal factors. 
External factors may include adequate infrastructure, institutions and resources (John, 
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2011) that will enable implementation while internal factors may include personal 
motivation, local bureaucracy and networks.  
 
While the examination of external factors is beyond the scope of the study, it is still 
necessary to acknowledge that the combination of unequal investment in rural areas 
and the lack of an adequate income distribution mechanism can account for some of 
the socioeconomic setbacks in the area.   
 
It is against such macro factors that the local Butuo government of Liangshan 
prefecture is struggling to provide child welfare services for disadvantaged children. 
Take the PRC Compulsory Education Law (1986) as an example. While the national 
legislation stipulates that every child in the country have the right to education, and 
must attend nine years of schools, enforcing this policy has been problematic in the 
context of Butuo. There are several reasons for the implementation gap.  
 
Firstly, a large majority of orphans and abandoned children in Butuo are cared for by 
extended relatives or grandparents. As in the case for rural China, kinship care 
remains to be the dominant form of care for orphans (Shang, 2008). While this may 
seem ideal, the situation becomes problematic when relatives are struggling to make 
ends meet themselves. Secondly, although the PRC law made education free, the 
reality is that there are additional incurred costs. These include transportation costs, 
costs on books, and also opportunity costs—foregone production output that the child 
would otherwise be able to offer in their homes with their help to farm.  
 
This problem has not gone unnoticed. The central government had issued the “two 
exemptions and one allowance” (两免一补) policy (2006) in response to these 
problems, which required local governments to provide the necessary books and 
teaching materials for students. However, the author’s field observation indicates that 
these financial assistance have not yet reached the general public. One of the major 
reasons why such policies cannot be put into effect is the mismatch between policy 
stipulations and availability of local resources to carry out those stipulations. As one 
government official shared: 
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“The thing is, our local government is required to ‘match’ what the central 
government had ordered us to do. But how can we match those funds when we don’t 
have enough money?” 
 
The issue of insufficient funding allocation continues to surface throughout the field 
study. Local governments simply do not have the capacity to enact these policies.  
 
Consequently, impoverished individuals are deterred from sending children to school. 
What’s more, because Butuo is a mountainous area, where residential dwelling can be 
long distances away (up to 7 hours walking distance) from the locations of school, it 
is logistically difficult to send these children to attend classes regularly.  
 
Fu Hui Enters: Why Collaborate?  
 
Set within the context of such policy gaps and difficulties in implementing policies 
intended to improve the livelihoods of disadvantaged children, why would the 
government choose to collaborate with an international nonprofit rather than delegate 
the tasks to government officials from various departments?  
 
Organizational theorists such as O’Toole and Montjoy (1984, p. 450) contend that 
organizations tend to develop “routines and standard operating procedures, whereby 
personnel interact in regular and predictable ways to solve regular and predictable 
problems”. While these procedures should increase an organization’s efficiency in the 
Weberian sense, these standardizations may also be perceived as bureaucratic 
constrains to problem-solving. The authors propose that such limitations may be 
overcome if collaboration with another actor coincides with their own goals, or that 
collaboration may bring in new resources that are otherwise unavailable.  
 
In confronting the child welfare problem in rural China, it appears that local 
governments, as organizations, had become entrenched in their own bureaucratic 
processes, such that their abilities to confront social problems in innovate and flexible 
ways have been hampered. For instance, while child welfare should be specifically 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), the reality in Liangshan 
reflects a far more complex process. One of the more pertinent bureaucratic problems 
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within the local government is the lack of communication between different 
government departments. For example, the author found that the “official” registered 
list of orphans procured by the Education Bureau is far different than the one 
provided by the MCA. As one government official from the Education Bureau shared: 
 
“The list is so problematic …  [the MCA] may not have the accurate list as we do.” 
 
Frustration can also be observed with another government official, who explained that 
surveys and reports conducted by the Education Bureau at schools are sometimes 
repeated by the MCA, without either of them informing each other. Redundancy 
hampers effectiveness.   
 
These implicit criticisms and complains of the procedures and ‘working culture’ of 
the local governments have significant implications on enacting child welfare policies. 
To say the least, given the inaccurate list of orphans, eligibility to monthly assistance 
for orphans (now at RMB 1000 according to Liangshan government documents) 
becomes problematic. Inaccurate registration is one of the major obstacles impeding 
the successful implementation of this particular policy. The lack of communication 
between government departments also created unnecessary duplicative practices that 
are surely ineffective.  
 
The cultural perspective of the organization theory can be drawn out at this point. 
While there are explicit rules as to what the Education Bureau should and should not 
do, it appears that the government, as an organization, has acquired some institutional 
characteristics, one of which is that it is common not to openly communicate with 
other departmental agencies or to share information.  
Table 2 outlines some of the barriers that have impeded the progress of child welfare 
development.  
 
Table 2. Barriers to Effective Policy Implementation  
Elements to 
Barriers 
Characteristics Consequence Child Outcome  
Poverty Extended kinship 
already deprived of 
resources 
Poor or lack capacity 
to care for orphans 
Neglect; resource 
deprivation ; child 
labor 
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Registration Poor registration 
techniques; parents 
died of AIDS not 
reported because of 
monthly cash subsidy  
Creates problems 
with eligibility 
Some children do not 
have a hukou account 
Orphans cannot 
receive assistance 
accordingly 
Policy Loopholes Lack of 
contextualization of 
national policy  
Local government 
cannot ‘match’ and 
carry out what 
national policies 
dictate due to poor 
local resources 
Children intended to 
benefit from national 
policy do not  
Organizational 
Culture 
Lack of 
communication and 
shared information 
between inter-
governmental 
department; 
HIV/AIDS numbers 
is regarded as state 
secret   
Redundancy; 
ineffectiveness; lack 
of audit and public 
accountability 
commitments; 
children orphaned 
from poverty and 
AIDS are invisible 
Provision of welfare 
is fragmented for 
children and can be 
inconsistent; needs of 
orphans ignored as 
not every child goes 
to school in the area 
due to poverty and 
ignorance  
Geographic 
isolation 
Households are 
sometimes located in 
mountainous regions 
Potential service 
recipients are 
unaware of their 
rights or simply too 
far to reach  
Children living in 
more remote areas 
are prevented to 
access services and 
resources they are 
entitled to 
Socio-cultural 
mismatch 
Sociocultural 
perceptions on 
“childhood”, “gender 
equality”, and “child 
rights” do not match 
what the national 
government had 
conceptualized as 
child rights  
General unawareness 
of the public 
(especially elderly 
caregivers) of the 
significance of 
education (especially 
for girls), caregiving 
responsibilities, 
medical care, etc. 
Children are 
deprived of the 
opportunities to 
attend schools, 
receive adequate 
financial assistance 
and medical care  
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From an organizational perspective, it makes sense for the Education Bureau to 
strategically align itself with Fu Hui. Firstly, as argued by O’Toole and Montjoy 
(1984), one of the motivating reasons why actors may consider collaboration is when 
the other party can bring in new resources that would otherwise be unattainable. 
Alluding to the instrumental perspective, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and subsequent 
scholars such as Townley and associates (2003) posit that organizations must ensure 
its own resource supply in order to serve their constituencies in a sustainable manner. 
This seems to be the case for the Butuo government. Cooperating with other local 
government departments such as the MCA will not bring in more resources. What Fu 
Hui offers is financial support, and a management model (skills transfer) that was 
previously unavailable. One government official shared: 
 
“[Fu Hui] introduced a new management model…How we monitor the quality of the 
service, people management, how we should hold people accountable, how we should 
write reports and track developmental targets of children…” 
 
The government gains several types of resources by collaborating with Fu Hui. That 
which is measurable is naturally the financial support received from Fu Hui. Fu Hui 
sponsors as many as 1,400 in the Liangshan area in their daily living expenses. The 
government also gains a set of skills, through skills-and knowledge transfer, to carry 
out improved monitoring and reporting techniques. As Salmenkari (2008) argues, 
NGOs can provide state agencies with information, and innovative techniques 
required to demonstrate efficient handling of social problems. This has enabled better 
deliverance of the service for orphans at primary school age.  
 
Symbolic Rewards  
What is not measurable is the political and moral legitimacy in the eyes of the people. 
In recent years, the Chinese government had put heavy emphasis on suzhi (quality), 
which is the salient characteristic for economic progress and social development (Hsu, 
2013; Kipnis, 2006; Yan, 2003). To achieve this, however, the State is expected to 
create the condition in which economic progress and social development can thrive. 
These include the provision of good schools, proper nutrition, adequate medical care, 
and access to new technology, ideas, experiences (Hsu, 2013).  
Hence, as an organization, it makes sense for the local Butuo government to enter into 
collaboration with Fu Hui since such collaborative relationship will precisely lead to 
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the betterment of nutrition, medical care, clothing, hygiene, and access to technology 
for orphans and disadvantaged children in the area.  
 
For Fu Hui, an organization whose mission is to improve the lives of orphans and 
disadvantaged children in the area, it also makes sense to enter collaboration with the 
local government. At the very least, it will allow them to gain legitimacy, access, and 
security to operate in this environment. Without the “permission” of local government, 
it would be close to impossible to access these communities.  
 
Organizational theorists also posit that organizational actors must seek to ensure a 
constant flow of resource supply necessary to both survive and achieve its mission, 
sometimes in a highly competitive environment (Lopez, Peon, & Oras, 2005; O'Toole 
& Montjoy, 1984). These scholars also argue that organizations tend to formulate 
their own strategies that will most likely fit the cultural frameworks extant in their 
society (Hsu, 2013; O’tool and Montjoy, 1984).  
 
Strategizing based on Instrumental-Rationality  
Being a relatively new philanthropic organization, Fu Hui is constantly soliciting 
support from the public: meeting with potential donors, giving presentation of its 
projects, appealing to friends and families for volunteers, managing fundraising 
campaigns and so on. And although it does not heavily rely on the government for 
funding, members of Fu Hui insisted repeatedly on how important it was to establish 
good relationship with the government. It is an “essential element”- in the words of an 
interviewee- for the organization to succeed. Ultimately, however, large-scale change 
must be enacted by the State. As one member of Fu Hui shares: 
“Our way of doing things [having established special classes for orphans in schools] 
convinced the local government that it could work. Now they are learning how to do 
it…we hope that one day they would know how to do it themselves…or that other 
organizations can do similar things using a similar model…” 
 
From an organizational stance, collaboration is beneficial to both parties at both 
tangible and symbolic levels. Yet, as with any decisions, there are trade-offs. These 
are outlined in Table 3.   
 
 
Table 3. The Costs and Benefits of Collaboration  
                                              Local Government  
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                      Gains                 Losses 
Tangible Level Financial Resources  
A set of management skills and 
techniques  
Significant time investment; at 
times, doing beyond what is 
“officially required”  
Symbolic Level Legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people; image of ‘responsible 
government’  
Personal satisfaction  
- Loss of full decision-
making power 
- Exposure of current 
organizational deficiency 
(as a govt. agency) 
                                                     Fu Hui  
                       Gains                Losses 
Tangible level Physical access to communities  
Provision of shelters for children 
by the government –shared cost  
Potential financial loss due to 
poor reporting techniques (in 
some cases)  
Symbolic level Fulfilling organization’s vision 
Validation and political approval 
to operate in the area  
Personal satisfaction  
Compromise autonomy 
Comprise some decision-
making power  
 
 
Outcomes for Child Welfare: Schools as De Facto Child Welfare Institutions  
 
The result of this collaboration is the inception of a unique care model for orphans 
and disadvantaged children in the area. In light of these logistical problems and policy 
gaps, the Butuo Education Bureau had become the de facto administrator for the care 
for orphans. While there is in fact a welfare institution in Butuo managed by the MCA, 
one government official from the Education Bureau hinted that due to resource 
constrain, the facility is poorly run. It is unlikely that outsiders can access this facility. 
Instead, boarding schools have been established so that orphans and other 
disadvantaged children living in remote areas can reside in these schools. These 
children usually go home during long holidays.  
 
While the Education Bureau is responsible for providing these children with adequate 
shelter and their education in classrooms, Fu Hui is responsible meeting their daily 
needs, including clothing (several sets of uniforms and blankets), nutrition (ensuring 
that children at least have 3 meals of meat per week), transportation coverage, 
medical insurance (purchased from local governments by Fu Hui on behalf of the 
children). The organization also hires “nannies”—mostly women and a few men, who 
live in the schools with these children to look after them.  
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Fu Hui has introduced a series of measures in order to ensure adequate quality of care 
for children. For example, nannies undergo training before serving these children, and 
are required to complete a detailed check-list on a daily basis for reporting and 
monitoring purposes. The list include items such as whether the children have had 
three meals that day, whether they have showered that day, whether anyone was sick 
that day, whether they have worn uniforms that day and so on. In order to minimize 
the risks of inaccurate reporting on the part of the nannies, government officials who 
are collaborating with Fu Hui randomly conduct “spot checks”. Members of Fu Hui 
also conduct these unexpected checks at random times throughout the year to ensure 
that their services and goods have been appropriately distributed to the students.  
 
These orphans are usually recruited at the age of 6, so that they can attend primary 1 
by age 7. Both members of Fu Hui and the Education Bureau conduct home visits 
together to validate the identity of the orphan. Once these orphans qualify, they are 
sent to specific boarding schools at the start of the term, so that they can begin their 
education career. Orphans are designated to attend what Fu Hui dubbed as “Starlet 
classes”, with each class numbering at around 40 – 50 orphans.  
 
Due to long traveling distances, these children reside at schools. It is within these 
‘boarding schools’ that Fu Hui tends to the children’s daily needs. In 2012, Fu Hui 
has established this care model in 13 schools in the Liangshan area, with each of this 
school being host to a different number of “Starlet classes”. 1,556 orphans are 
benefiting from this care model at present.  
 
Although the living conditions for these orphans are still far from ideal, there have 
been significant and encouraging improvements at the very least. Fu Hui has provided 
them with adequate shelter, food and medical care. It is unrealistic to expect huge 
changes overnight. 
 
Instrumental Rationality or Organizational Culture Through Leadership?  
Although the instrumental perspective provides some form of rationalization as to 
why the local government and Fu Hui chose to enter into collaboration, it does not         
fully explain why this particular working relationship has been relatively successful. 
Similarly, while Fu Hui and the Butuo Education Bureau have signed an official 
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contract that outlines the details pertaining to their collaboration, it does not 
necessarily mean that collaboration would yield to better outcomes and results for 
child welfare provision.  
 
These considerations, along with field observations, have led the author to 
hypothesize that collaboration success is significantly shaped by personal 
characteristics within these respective organizations. Indeed, Abdulla and Shaw 
(1999) have argued that certain personal attributes are conducive to higher 
organizational commitment. This paper contends that only when both organizations 
(in this case, the government and Fu Hui) are highly committed that collaboration 
would succeed.  
 
In organizational literature, the debate pertaining to commitment is largely centralized 
between two propositions: whether the bond between the individual and the 
organization is a necessity (rational choice), or whether its nature is motivated by 
something beyond rationality such as feelings, personal values and goals (Abdulla & 
Shaw, 1999). This parallels with the dichotomy found between the instrumental and 
cultural perspective of organizational theory. Mowday and associates (1982) suggest 
that organizational commitment is an internalization of the values and goals of the 
organization, a personal willingness and desire to work on behalf of the organization 
in order to achieve whatever the organization had set out to achieve. To date, 
organizational commitment has expanded to include subcategories such as “normative 
commitment”, “emotional commitment” and “continuation commitment” (Atak & 
Erturgut, 2010), with each of these categories affecting in varying degrees, individual 
behavior within the organization.  
 
Indeed, from the interviews so far conducted with the directors and members of Fu 
Hui, as well as the officials that are closely working with Fu Hui, it appears that these 
individuals are generally highly committed to their work. At times, such commitments 
even appear to be ‘irrational’ from say, an economic standpoint. This reflects the 
limitations of instrumental rationality in its power to explain certain choices and 
decisions. For instance, one government official shared: 
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“I can easily find a job in the city where the pay is three times higher…but when I 
look at the improvements we have achieved so far…I don’t want to leave…” 
 
Similarly, another official attributes her decision to remain in Butuo to the sentiments 
and bond that have developed between some children and herself. Such satisfaction 
was not derived from economic benefits, but by a sense of emotional commitment. 
Such sentiments can be found within members of Fu Hui as well, who receive no 
salary and yet continuously work for the organization. There are as many as 40 long-
term volunteers for the organization. As the director of Fu Hui shared: 
 
“Sometimes, I don’t even know who’s helping who. When I see the change we have 
made, I feel so happy…it’s contagious.” 
 
The internalization of these values, beliefs and goals are apparent in both 
organizations, and the individuals in these organizations. Such personal traits and 
beliefs can, to a large extent, account for both organizational and collaboration 
successes.    
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Employing the organizational theory is a useful way in which to analyze the 
relationship between INGO and State relationship. As organizations, both Fu Hui and 
the local government have their own organizational needs to fulfill. There may be 
differences in motivation and interests in the collaboration relationship between the 
government and Fu Hui, such that the local government may seek to gain legitimacy 
from the public, while Fu Hui aims to push for better accountability and child welfare 
management. These exhibiting qualities seem to resonate with the classic liberalism 
perspective under collaboration theory, and mirror the instrumental perspective of 
organizational theory. Nevertheless, as a result of their collaboration, a unique care 
model for orphans is produced. Both actors adhere to previously established 
procedures and honor the contractual agreement with each other, arriving at the 
ultimate goal to improve the conditions for orphans in the area. In addition, there are 
both costs and advantages for both parties to enter into collaboration.   
 
To effectively implement child welfare policies, it is crucial to contextualize, and take 
into account both external and internal factors. Many areas in rural areas still lack the 
proper infrastructure and resources to carry out national policies that are intended to 
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improve the livelihoods and wellbeing for orphans and disadvantaged children. These 
deficiencies need to be rectified immediately lest the wellbeing of orphans and 
disadvantaged children become further jeopardized.  
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